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1. It’s Complicated 
Reflexive thought is thought about thought, or thought about other mental states more 
generally. As such, the ability to engage in reflexive thought is generally regarded as a 
complex intellectual achievement: one that is beyond the capacities of most animals –
indeed, perhaps all animals except humans. Denial of this ability can be made on a 
variety of grounds. First, many argue, one cannot think a thought about any given mental 
state without having the concept of that mental state. And so, it is claimed, attributing the 
capacity for reflexive thought to non-human animals (henceforth “animals”) would entail 
attributing to them an implausibly sophisticated conceptual repertoire. In addition to the 
issue of burgeoning conceptual repertoire is another – quasi-empirical – objection. If a 
creature has the ability to engage in reflexive thought, then it must have the ability to 
attribute mental states both to itself and others. It is argued that there is no empirical 
evidence for this ability in any non-human animals. Any apparent evidence in favor of 
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this ability can always, it is argued, be explained in more parsimonious terms: for 
example in ways that involve an ability for behavioral abstraction (i.e. to form 
generalizations about behavior and its likely consequences) but not the ability to think 
thoughts about what is going on in the mind of another.
1
 Assessing these arguments 
against the possibility of reflexive thought in animals is a huge undertaking – both 
empirically and conceptually – one that has already generated countless books and 
journal articles, with no sign of resolution on the horizon.  
 We shall not address this question directly. Instead, our approach will question the 
importance usually attached to the issue of whether animals are reflexive thinkers. This 
importance derives from the belief that the capacity for reflexive thought is built into, or 
required for, many other capacities. If animals lack the capacity for reflexive thought 
they, therefore, must also lack these other capacities. This is the idea that we shall resist. 
At the heart of this, we shall argue, is a pervasive tendency, shared by philosopher and 
scientist alike, toward over-complication. 
Suppose there is a property – let us call it P – that, common sense decrees, is 
widely distributed in nature: being possessed not only by normal adult human beings, but 
also by children and at least some animals. While property P is, on some level, mundane 
and familiar – that is the basis of confidence in the widespread distribution of this 
property – the precise theoretical articulation of P is controversial. There is a range of 
theoretical options that might be used to capture this property P, running from the simple 
to the complex. On some of the more complex options, it turns out that the distribution of 
P will not be as wide as common sense supposes: for example, the possession of P by 
                                                        
1 Povinelli & Vonk (2003, 2004); Penn & Povinelli (2007, 2013). 
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children and other animals will be rendered problematic, unlikely or impossible. Thus, 
there is a clash between common sense (“P is widely distributed through the human and 
animal world”) and theory (“P is probably/definitely restricted to normal adult humans”). 
We think it is fair to say that, in this sort of case, there has been a persistent historical 
tendency, in both philosophical and scientific treatments of animals, to favor the 
restrictive theory over the more liberal common sense. Indeed, in philosophy, a few 
dissenting voices aside, this tendency is endemic, and almost definitive of the attitude 
that, historically speaking, this discipline has taken towards animals. It is unclear why 
this should be. Philosophers are, perhaps, complicated people, and have a natural 
proclivity to favor the complex over the simple. But this tendency is not restricted to 
(professional) philosophers. There is, we think, a lot of truth in Wittgenstein’s (implicit) 
claim that we are all philosophers.
2
 Scientists also frequently find themselves in the grip 
of philosophical assumptions and confusions, and the scientists who study animals are no 
exception. 
The approach we are going to defend, we shall refer to as aponoian. Aponoia 
comes from the Greek, apó, which means ‘away from’, ‘separate’, ‘without’, and noûs, 
which means ‘intelligence’, ‘thought’. An aponoian approach to psychological abilities 
is, accordingly, one that aims to leave intelligence and thought aside.
3
 This does not mean 
– and we can't really emphasize this enough – that animals are lacking in intelligence. 
Aponoia is something that applies to humans and other animals equally. The idea we 
                                                        
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Philosophy is a tool useful only against philosophers and the philosopher in 
us.” MS 219, emphasis is ours. 
3 We would like to thank Luis Gil for this term. 
 4 
mean to convey is this: seemingly complex psychological abilities are often not as 
complex as they seem. Intelligence is, in this sense, often not as intelligent as it seems.  
 
2. Two Mistakes 
This paper will inveigh against the philosophical art of (over-) complication. The 
endemic over-complication in question can take a variety of forms but two, in particular, 
stand out. 
Suppose there is a property P, which might, in different contexts, stand for any 
number of psychological traits and/or abilities, including consciousness, emotions, 
empathy, beliefs (and other propositional attitudes), action and agency (including moral 
agency). One type of complication, then, consists in a rather unseemly rush to go meta: to 
assume that articulation of a given psychological phenomenon, P, requires appeal to a 
meta-level phenomenon of some sort: awareness of P, thoughts about P, the ability to 
scrutinize P, concepts of P, and so on. We shall refer to this baleful rush to the meta-level 
– in contexts where it is neither necessary nor fruitful – as a tendency toward premature 
meta-articulation. Obviously, this tendency is directly related to the issue of the 
importance of reflexive thought in animals. To appeal to the meta-level in explanation of 
a given mental phenomenon – consciousness, emotions, beliefs, empathy, and so on – is 
to suppose that it is not possible for a creature to possess or exhibit that phenomenon 
unless it is capable of engaging in reflexive thought of some sort. Conversely, if 
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possession of these things does not require a meta-level explanation, then the lack of the 
ability to engage in reflexive thought does not preclude possession of these phenomena. 
Second, there is another tendency that, unfortunately, stubbornly resists our 
attempts to provide it with a catchy appellation. This tendency is best introduced by 
example. Suppose we are tempted to say, on the basis of its behavior, that one animal is 
the subject of a given emotion, say fear. The little dog, let us suppose, fears the big dog. 
Given an array of behavioral, evolutionary and neurobiological evidence, our attribution 
of fear to the dog does not seem to be an unreasonable one. However, suppose the 
‘philosopher in us’, as Wittgenstein put it, urges caution: to fear the big dog, the little dog 
would have to understand that the big dog is worthy of fear – that it is the sort of thing 
that should or ought to be feared. But now we seem to be attributing to the little dog the 
concept of ought or should – the concept of warrant, as we might say. And this does 
seem to be an overly sophisticated concept. Therefore, we might find the philosopher in 
us urging us to abandon the idea that the dog can possess the emotion of fear.  
This, we shall argue, would be an example of confusing the ability to make a 
certain judgment and to track a certain judgment. Accordingly, we shall refer to it – and 
we note, once again, that if there is a catchier appellation for this confusion, it is beyond 
the abilities of the authors to devise – as the making/tracking confusion. The little dog, 
we shall argue, does not need to make the judgment that the big dog ought to be feared, 
or that it warrants fear. Rather, a far weaker condition is all that is required: if the dog’s 
emotion is not, as we shall say, misguided (a technical term to be explained later) then the 
claim that the big dog ought to be feared must be true. In such circumstances, we shall 
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say, the dog’s emotion tracks the truth of the claim. The little dog does not need to judge 
that the big dog ought to be feared, as long as his or her emotion tracks the truth of the 
claim.
4
 The making/tracking confusion is important in its own right. In this paper, 
however, given that our primary concern is the issue of reflexive thought in animals, we 




Descartes claimed, notoriously, that animals lack minds, and most have interpreted this 
claim as a denial that animals are conscious.
5
 This encouraged generations of Port-Royal 
scientists to nail living, conscious animals to boards and dissect them. The screams and 
screeches, they assured themselves and others, were just the rubbing together of various 
mechanisms, and should not be taken to indicate anything about the mental life of the 
animal – for there was no such mental life. Equally notoriously, Descartes had no 
convincing arguments for this dismissal of the mental lives of animals. When pushed, he 
resorted to the observation that if animals had minds they would have immortal souls, 
and they could not be reasonably credited with these.
6
 
                                                        
4 This idea is developed in more detail in Rowlands (2012), chapter 2.  
5 Interpretations of Descartes diverge. Some claim that while he was committed to denying them 
thought or reason, Descartes did allow that animals were sentient, or could feel. Cottingham (1978). 
This animal-friendlier interpretation of Descartes has been disputed by Sztybel, and in the opinion of 
at least one of the authors is dubiously compatible with many of the things Descartes (1927) asserts 
in ‘On the automatism of brutes’. However, Descartes scholarship is not our business here, and so we 
shall simply note that the denial of any sort of mentality – thought and feeling – to animals is a 
common interpretation of Descartes. 
6 Descartes, (1927) p. 357. 
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 One might think that, today, we have shaken off this post-medieval nonsense, but 
the claim that animals lack consciousness has, in fact, been defended in recent 
philosophical discourse. This defense turns on what is known as the higher-order thought 
(HOT) model of consciousness. We discuss this not because the view is widespread – 
even amongst philosophers, few today are willing to bite the bullet and deny 
consciousness to animals – but because it is a glaring, and so for our purposes useful, 
example of the pitfalls of assuming a phenomenon must be explained by appeal to the 
meta-level. 
The sense of consciousness in question is phenomenal: the way it seems or feels 
when one has or undergoes an experience. The overwhelming preponderance of the 
scientific evidence suggests that this sort of consciousness is possessed by most, perhaps 
all, vertebrates, and some invertebrates and so, at a conservative estimate, probably made 
its first appearance (on this planet at least) 300-500 million years ago. However, some 
proponents of HOT have contested this claim.
7
  
In order to understand the HOT model of consciousness, two distinctions are 
required. The first is between creature and state consciousness. Consciousness can be 
ascribed to both creatures and mental states. A creature can be conscious in the sense that 
it is awake as opposed to asleep. But a mental state – a desire, for example – can also be 
conscious or unconscious. The second distinction is between transitive and intransitive 
consciousness. Transitive consciousness is consciousness of something. If I (consciously) 
                                                        
7 Notably, Peter Carruthers (1989). Not all defenders of HOT, by any means, will endorse this 
conclusion. Indeed, most regard such an implication as a reductio of the HOT account, and so seek to 
distance themselves from this implausible conclusion by trying to find ways to show why HOT does 
not entail it. See, for example, David Rosenthal (2004). 
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think that the cat is on the mat, then I am transitively conscious of this state-of-affairs. 
Creatures are transitively conscious of things; mental states are not. My thought that the 
cat is on the mat is not conscious of anything. I am conscious of the cat being on the mat 
in virtue of having this thought. My thought that the cat is on the mat, on the other hand, 
is intransitively conscious when I am (consciously) thinking it. Based on these 
distinctions, we can express the guiding idea behind HOT accounts as follows: 
Intransitive state consciousness is to be explained in terms of transitive creature 
consciousness.  
According to the HOT model of consciousness, for a given mental state of mine – 
say pain – to be conscious, it is necessary that I form (or, on some versions, be able to 
form) a thought about this pain – a thought to the effect that I am in pain. This thought 
confers consciousness on my pain. Until I form the thought – or unless I possess the 
ability to form the thought – my pain is non-conscious. 8  The thought makes me 
transitively conscious of my pain, and in doing so makes my pain intransitively 
conscious.  
 The HOT model is implausible. In particular, it seems to fall foul of a dilemma. Is 
the higher-order thought (intransitively) conscious? If it is, then HOT does not explain 
consciousness but presupposes it. If it is not, then it is utterly mysterious how the thought 
is supposed to make me transitively conscious of my pain. Intransitively unconscious 
                                                        
8 HOT accounts come in two forms – actualist and dispositionalist. According to actualist versions, for 
my pain to be conscious, I must actually think that I am in pain. According to dispositionalist 
versions, I need only be able to from the thought. The differences between these two versions of the 
HOT account are not important for our purposes. 
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thoughts do not make their subjects transitively conscious of their objects – that is 
precisely what it is for them to be intransitively unconscious. 
 Suppose, for example, I think unconsciously – perhaps due to various 
mechanisms of repression – that someone very close to me is seriously ill. What would 
this mean? We might explain it in terms of various unexplained feelings of melancholy 
that assail me when I am talking to them, or a vague sense of foreboding that I can't quite 
pin down. However, what the thought cannot do, in its unconscious form, is make me 
aware of the fact that the person is seriously ill. Because as soon as it does that it 
becomes, by definition, a conscious thought. To become aware of the fact that my friend 
is seriously ill is to consciously think that my friend is seriously ill. That is, the thought 
has become intransitively conscious. That a thought does not make me aware of what it is 
about is precisely what it means for the thought to be intransitively unconscious. 
Conversely, as soon as it does make me aware of what it is about, it becomes a conscious 
thought – because making me aware of what it is about is precisely what it is for the 
thought to be conscious.
9
     
 The appeal to a higher-order thought  to explain consciousness does not work. 
This is an example of premature meta-articulation. In this case, the premature meta-
articulation seems to be based on the attribution of seemingly miraculous powers to the 
meta-level: the idea that the meta-level can somehow magically bestow something on a 
range of phenomena that is intrinsically lacking in the phenomena themselves. This form 
                                                        
9 See Rowlands (2001a) and (2001b), chapter 5. 
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of premature meta-articulation, therefore, is grounded in what we might call the miracle-
of-the-meta.
10
 This is the general form of the miracle: 
1. First-order phenomena a, b, c etc. are intrinsically lacking in some property P. 
(In this case, P = phenomenal consciousness). 
2. Higher-order phenomena x, y, z take a, b, c, as their objects, and in so doing confer P 
on a, b, c. 
The problem – the reason why this schema is miraculous – lies in this dilemma: 
3. Do x, y, z possess P? 
4. If so, then we have not explained P but simply presupposed it. 
5. If not, then it is mysterious how x, y z can confer P on a, b, c. 
In other words, the appeal to the meta-level cannot do the work it is supposed to do, and 
is therefore fruitless.
11
 While many prominent forms of premature meta-articulation are 
grounded in the miracle-of-the meta, as we shall see, this is not true for all cases. 
Therefore, we shall treat premature meta-articulation and the miracle of the meta as 
distinct fallacies, with the latter being a category of the former. 
 The usefulness of the HOT account as an example of premature meta-articulation 
is limited, because the account has not achieved widespread acceptance. We use it 
                                                        
10 We understand the relation between premature meta-articulation and the miracle-of-the-meta as 
one of genus to species. All cases of the miracle-of-the-meta are cases of premature meta-articulation, 
but not the other way around.   
11 Rowlands (2012), chapter 6. 
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because it provides an exceptionally clear example of premature meta-articulation. As we 
shall see, there are other examples of premature meta-articulation that many find more 
plausible. Plausible or not, we shall argue that they suffer from the same deficits. 
 
4. Belief I: Premature Meta-Articulation 
Some have argued that animals cannot have beliefs. In this, and the following section, we 
shall argue that their case invariably depends either on premature meta-articulation or the 
making/tracking confusion. This section deals with premature meta-articulation about 
belief. 
 Donald Davidson argues that “dumb” animals (i.e. animals incapable of engaging 
in linguistic communication) are incapable of having beliefs: “First, I argue that in order 
to have a belief, it is necessary to have the concept of belief. Secondly, I argue that in 
order to have the concept of belief one must have language.”12 The requirement that one 
possess the concept of belief in order to possess a belief may seem, prima facie, unduly 
intellectualistic. Davidson thinks otherwise:  
Here I turn for help to the phenomenon of surprise, since I think that surprise 
requires the concept of a belief. Suppose I believe there is a coin in my pocket. I 
empty my pocket and find no coin. I am surprised. Clearly enough I could not be 
surprised (though I could be startled) if I did not have beliefs in the first place. 
And perhaps it is equally clear that having a belief, at least one of the sort I have 
                                                        
12 Davidson (1975) and (1985) 
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taken for my example, entails the possibility of surprise. If I believe I have a coin 
in my pocket, something might happen that would change my mind. But surprise 
involves a further step. It is not enough that I first believe there is a coin in my 
pocket, and after emptying my pocket I no longer have this belief. Surprise 
requires that I be aware of a contrast between what I did believe and what I come 
to believe. Such awareness, however, is a belief about a belief: if I am surprised, 
then among other things I come to believe my original belief was false.
13
 
To be surprised, one must be able to have a belief about a belief. However, one cannot 
have a belief about a belief unless one has the concept of belief. But to have the concept 
of belief requires the concept of objective truth: “Much of the point of the concept of 
belief is that it is the concept of a state of an organism which can be true or false, correct 
or incorrect. To have the concept of belief is therefore to have the concept of objective 
truth.”14 But the concept of objective truth, Davidson argues, for reasons deriving from 
his semantic theory, is not possible for creatures lacking in language. 
 There is much about this argument that can be questioned.
15
 However, we shall 
simply focus on stopping the argument before it starts. Davidson’s conception of surprise 
is a meta-cognitive one. To be surprised requires (i) being aware of two distinct beliefs, 
and, in virtue of this, (ii) being aware of the contrast between them. The claim that 
animals cannot be surprised is, of course, itself a rather surprising one in that it 
contradicts a wealth of evidence, scientific and anecdotal, that suggests surprise is rather 
                                                        
13 Davidson (1985), p. 478. Emphasis is ours. 
14 Davidson (1985), p. 478. 
15 Indeed, Davidson often puts the term ‘argument’ here in scare quotes, recognizing that the 
argument is far from compelling. 
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widespread in the animal kingdom. Let’s us take a case of apparent surprise. Hugo, a dog, 
requests to be let out of the back door for his nightly constitutional. It has been raining, 
and a rather large American bullfrog sits outside, a few feet away. Hugo exits in his usual 
way, but upon noticing the frog, freezes for around thirty seconds, staring intently.  
 It would be implausible to claim that nowhere in this little tableau is there any 
element of surprise. It would also be implausible to attribute to Hugo an awareness of the 
contrast between his initial and subsequent beliefs about the state of the patio vis-à-vis 
large American bullfrogs. However, to explain Hugo’s surprise, it is possible to take an 
aponoian approach in which there is no need to attribute to him any such thing. Within 
this approach, all that is required to explain surprise is the postulation of a first-order 
mechanism that records a discrepancy between the content of a belief and the way the 
world is.
16
 Suppose we grant that Hugo has a dispositional belief about the patio of 
roughly this form: when I go out the door, things will be more or less the same as they 
usually are. The postulated mechanism works by detecting a discrepancy between this 
belief and the way the world, in fact, is. Hugo is, as a result of this discrepancy, surprised. 
Or, better, surprise is the experiential form the detection of this discrepancy takes. 
Surprise, therefore, does not need to be explained meta-cognitively. 
 The mistake Davidson has made, in effect, is to confuse awareness of the contents 
of beliefs with awareness of beliefs. The content of a belief is what the belief is about. 
What the belief is about will be, roughly, a state-of-affairs: an arrangement of objects and 
properties in the world. To have a dispositional belief is to be disposed to entertain 
content – to believe that a certain state-of-affairs is the case – under certain eliciting 
                                                        
16 This point has been made by Peter Carruthers (2008) 
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conditions. The content of Hugo’s belief, we have supposed, is that the patio is more or 
less the way it usually is: no surprises there. This belief, presumably, exists in 
dispositional form: Hugo does not need to be consciously thinking this to himself. There 
is, however, a surprise there, as Hugo quickly perceives. Hugo, thus, becomes aware of 
the new content: thing, there! And so the surprise-detecting mechanism kicks in to detect 
the difference between the content of his perception and the content of his dispositional 
belief. In no part of this account do we need to postulate meta-cognitive abilities or 
arrangements such as beliefs about beliefs. Davidson’s position is, then, an example of 
unnecessary premature meta-articulation. 
 
5. Belief II: The Making/Tracking Confusion 
Davidson, along with Stephen Stich and others, has another argument against the 
possibility that animals can believe. In this section we shall try to show this argument 
falls victim to the making/tracking confusion. 
Consider the following scenario, based on Malcolm (1973). A dog chases a 
squirrel up a tree. The squirrel jumps from one tree to the next, and eventually disappears. 
The dog does not see this, and sits at the foot of the tree barking. It is natural to explain 
the dog’s behavior in terms of his or her belief that the squirrel is in the tree (conjoined 
with, perhaps, its desire to catch the squirrel, or its frustration at not being able to do so, 
and so on). It cannot, after all, see that the squirrel is in the tree – the squirrel is no longer 
there. 
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 Davidson (1975, 1985) and Stich (1979) disagree with this interpretation of the 
situation. Davidson puts his argument as follows: 
Can the dog believe of an object that it is a tree? This would seem impossible 
unless we suppose that the dog has many general beliefs about trees: that they are 
growing things, that they need soil and water, that they have leaves or needles, 
that they burn. There is no fixed list of things someone with the concept of a tree 
must believe, but without many general beliefs there would be no reason to 
identify a belief as a belief about a tree, much less an oak tree. Similar 
considerations apply to the dog’s supposed thinking about the cat.17  
The more general moral of these considerations is:  
We identify thoughts, distinguish between them, describe them for what they are, 
only as they can be located within a dense network of related beliefs. If we really 
can intelligibly ascribe single beliefs to a dog, we must be able to imagine how we 
would decide whether the dog has many other beliefs of the kind necessary for 
making sense of the first.
18
  
Davidson focuses on the tree. We’ll focus on the squirrel. Does the dog – let us call him 
Hugo – believe that the squirrel is a mammal, that it is warm-blooded, that it has a 
skeleton, and so on? All these beliefs, Davidson claims, are part of our concept of a 
squirrel, and so without them Hugo cannot share our concept. Therefore, the attribution to 
Hugo of the belief that there is a squirrel in the tree is problematic. The attribution of a 
                                                        
17 Davidson (1985), p. 474. 
18 Davidson (1985), p. 475. 
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belief about the squirrel to Hugo depends on his possession of the concept of squirrel. 
However, possession of a concept depends on possession of a network of related beliefs. 
Therefore, attribution of beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) is a holistic enterprise. 
Roughly: 
Attribution-holism: The attribution of a single belief or other propositional 
attitude to an individual requires, and only makes sense in terms of, the attribution 
of a network of related beliefs. 
This attribution-holism precludes attribution of beliefs to individuals who do not share 
our belief-network. Hugo, along with all other animals, is such an individual. 
 We might call this the ‘anchoring’ argument. The content of any concept is 
anchored to a network of related beliefs. The human concept of squirrel is anchored to the 
network of related beliefs shared by humans. We have to suppose that Hugo does not 
possess this concept. But, therefore, we cannot attribute beliefs about squirrels to Hugo, 
for when we do so we employ a concept (‘our’ concept of squirrel) that he does not 
possess. More generally, the attribution of individual beliefs to individuals is constrained 
by the networks of beliefs they hold. If this network is not shared with us, we cannot 
attribute beliefs to them, for such attribution would be predicated on concepts they do not 
possess. 
The anchoring argument is unconvincing. At the heart of it lies an equivocation 
between the issue of (i) whether animals have beliefs at all and (ii) which beliefs they 
have. At most, the argument shows that we may not be able to attribute beliefs to animals 
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because of a divergence in the content their beliefs would possess and the concepts we 
would employ in ascribing those beliefs. The argument does not show that animals do not 
possess beliefs, merely that we cannot specify the content of their beliefs, and so cannot 
ascribe beliefs to them. But if that is the problem, then there is a well-known apparatus 
for getting around it. 
 Here is a famous philosophical thought experiment. It sometimes gives 
philosophers a bad name, because it seems so far-fetched but, in fact, it is just a way of 
making graphic a simple point. There is a planet – Twin Earth, which exactly duplicates 
Earth in every respect bar one: there is no water on Twin Earth. Instead, there is a 
substance that looks, tastes, and feels exactly like water, and that fills the oceans and 
rivers, and emerges from the faucets, of Twin Earth. A molecule-for-molecule twin of 
someone on Earth speaks twin English, and so has beliefs that he or she would express 
with sentences of the form, ‘Water is wet’, for example. However, the Twin can have no 
water-beliefs. There is no water on his or her planet. He or she has only ever been in 
contact with this other substance. We can call it retaw, for ease of identification: The 
Twin only has retaw-beliefs (though speaking Twin English he or she would express 
these beliefs using the term ‘water’. He/she calls retaw ‘water’). The point of the thought 
experiment is this: a person’s beliefs can vary even though everything in his or her head – 
they are molecule-for-molecule duplicates – remains the same. But that doesn't matter for 
our purposes. 
 Suppose we accept the conclusion of this thought experiment. Then, if we explain 
the Twin’s retaw-drinking behavior through postulating a desire to quench his/her thirst 
 18 
and a belief that water will quench it, our explanation would be false. Nevertheless, there 
is surely something about it that is right. It is not as if we tried to explain his/her behavior 
by way of the desire to quench his/her thirst and the belief that water is poisonous, or the 
belief that colorless green ideas sleep furiously. The explanation may not be strictly 
correct, but it is not far off the truth. 
 The crux is how to explain the idea of being not far off the truth, and there is a 
way of doing this. The truth of the claim (or proposition) that water is wet guarantees the 
truth of the claim that retaw is wet. If the former proposition is true, then the latter must 
be true also. More than this, the guaranteeing of truth derives from the fact that there is a 
reliable connection between the properties of water and the properties of retaw: if water is 
wet, colorless, odorless, transparent, thirst-quenching etc. then retaw must be these things 
too. This reliable connection between properties is simply a feature of the way the 
thought experiment is set up. 
 We can apply this general idea to Hugo the dog. Suppose Hugo represents the 
squirrel in, for example, affordance-based terms. That is, the dog represents the squirrel 
as a chase-able thing. This is, of course, an empirical matter, but suppose, for the sake of 
argument, it is correct. Corresponding to the proposition that we entertain, namely that 
the squirrel is in the tree, Hugo thinks a thought along the following lines: the chase-able 
thing is up there. Can we still, legitimately use our proposition to explain Hugo’s 
behavior? The answer, we suspect, is that we can, and while we won't be strictly correct, 
what we say is close enough to the truth to be useful and enlightening. More precisely, 
what we say will be useful and enlightening if the following two conditions – designed to 
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parallel the Twin Earth case – hold. First, the truth of the (anchored to us) claim that there 
is a squirrel in the tree guarantees the truth of the (anchored to Hugo) claim that the 
chase-able thing is up there. If the former is true, then the latter is true also. Secondly, 
this guaranteeing of truth holds because there is a reliable connection between the 
properties of squirrels and chase-able things: squirrels, for Hugo, are reliably chase-able 
(and things in trees are reliably up and there). 
 Consider the first condition. If the (anchored to us) claim that the squirrel is in the 
tree is true then the (anchored to Hugo) claim that the chase-able thing is up there must 
also be true. The truth of the first anchored claim guarantees the truth of the second one. 
Moreover, and this is the second condition, the reason the first anchored claim guarantees 
the truth of the second is because of a reliable connection between the property of being a 
squirrel and the property of being a chase-able thing. For Hugo, squirrels are reliably 
chase-able: that is, for any x, if x is a squirrel then x, for Hugo, is chase-able. When these 
first and second conditions are met we can say that the (anchored to us) claim that the 
squirrel is in the tree tracks the (anchored to Hugo) claim that the chase-able thing is up 
there. There is a truth-guaranteeing relation between the two claims, where this is 




 Note, once this apparatus is accepted, we don’t even need to know what beliefs 
Hugo has vis-à-vis squirrels. He may represent them as chase-able things or by way of 
some other categories entirely. All that is required for the attribution of the belief that the 
squirrel is in the tree to be useful and enlightening (if not strictly true) is that the 
                                                        
19 See Rowlands (2012), chapter 2 for an elaboration of this argument. 
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(anchored to us) proposition that the squirrel is in the tree track whatever proposition it is 
that can truly be employed in attributing the belief to Hugo. 
 Davidson’s argument against attributing beliefs to animals, therefore, is a version 
of the making/tracking confusion. It assumes that attributions of beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes to an animal can be legitimate only when the animal is capable of 
entertaining a given claim or proposition – that is, capable of making a given judgment. 
We have argued that this is too strong. There are various ways in which an attribution of 
belief to an animal can be legitimate. One of these ways is that the attribution be useful or 
enlightening – that it allows us to make sense of the animal’s behavior. But this 
condition, we have argued, does not require that the animals be able to make the 
judgment, or entertain the proposition, implicated in the belief that we attribute to the 
animals. Rather, all that is required for the belief-attribution to be enlightening – that is, 
to have explanatory value – is that there is an appropriate relation of tracking – in the 
sense explained above – between the thought the animal actually thinks (which is an 
empirical matter) and the thought we attribute to it.   
 
6. Emotion 
A Capuchin monkey sees its fellow being rewarded with (highly prized) grapes for 
completing a given task. Upon completing the same task, this monkey is given a (not at 
all highly prized) piece of cucumber. After several repetitions, the seemingly enraged 
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monkey hurls its cucumber out of the cage at the researcher.
20
 If the players in this scene 
were human, it would be natural to describe their behavior by appeal to the emotion of 
indignation. 
 Jaak Panksepp has argued, on neurobiological grounds, that basic emotions such 
as happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust extend beyond the human realm, 
encompassing all mammals, in all likelihood birds, and possibly reptiles.
21
 This is not a 
minority view in affective neuroscience. Panksepp’s view also coincides – with the 
possible exception of reptiles – quite closely with common sense. Arrayed against 
common sense and affective neuroscience, however, we find philosophers who regard the 
attribution of any emotions to animals as deeply problematic – and the attribution of a 
fairly complex emotion such as indignation especially so. 
 There is a tendency to think that emotions are somehow more primitive than 
cognitive states such as belief. It is unclear from where this idea derives, but its 
legitimacy is very questionable. Emotions are, at least conceptually, more complex than 
cognitive states. An emotion contains everything a belief contains and more.  
Emotions are distinct from moods. Like beliefs and other cognitive states, 
emotions have intentional content. Fear is fear of something, or that something will 
happen. Anger is directed at someone because they did something. This means that 
emotions have intentional content. Indeed, they are individuated by this content. If the 
monkey were indeed indignant, the content of his indignation would be that he is being 
                                                        
20 Brosnan & de Waal (2003) 
21 Panksepp (1998). Panksepp questions whether surprise and disgust should be classified as 
genuine emotions rather than simpler types of motivational state.   
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offered a cucumber (when his fellow Capuchin is being offered a grape). This is what 
individuates the emotion – distinguishes it from other cases of indignation. That he is 
being offered a cucumber is what we might regard as the factual content of the 
Capuchin’s emotion. In their possession of factual content, emotions are akin to beliefs. 
Emotions are different from beliefs, however, in that there is more to their content 
than the factual. Implicit in the monkey’s indignation would be the evaluative content 
that his being offered the grape is wrong. The content of the emotion is composed of the 
factual judgment (‘I am being given a cucumber, again’), and the moral judgment (‘This 
is wrong!’ or ‘I am being wronged!’). This seems to be a moral judgment. Not all 
emotions involve specifically moral judgments. But all involve evaluative judgments of 
some sort. If the little dog does, indeed, fear the big dog, then implicit in this, it seems, is 
the judgment that the big dog is worthy of fear – that it should be feared.  
Because emotions have both factual and evaluative content, philosophers 
skeptical of the idea that animals can have emotions have two different options for 
developing their case. They might contest the claim that animals can entertain factual 
content. We have already discussed this idea in the previous two sections. The other 
version of the case turns on hostility to the idea that animals can make moral or other 
evaluative judgments required for possession of emotions. That is the avenue of hostility 
we shall examine in this section. We shall argue that this idea is an example of the 
making/tracking confusion. 
To make a moral judgment seems to require the possession of the moral concepts 
of right and wrong. And it is not unreasonable to suppose that Capuchin monkeys do not 
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possess these concepts. Underlying this thought is the distinction between concept 
possession, on the one hand, and the ability to discriminate on the other. If an ant is 
sprayed with oleic acid, its fellow ants will remove it from the colony – oleic acid is 
given off when an ant dies. Ants can discriminate, with a reasonable level of precision, 
which of their fellows are dead from which of them are not. But it would be implausible 
to suppose that they possess the concept of death. Similarly, it might be argued, animals 
might be trained to discriminate things that are good from things that are bad without 
possessing the concept of good and bad. To possess that concept, one would need to 
know not merely which things are good and bad but in what their goodness or badness 
consists.  
If we accept this, then it seems that (1) if emotions such as indignation involve 
moral judgments, and (2) moral judgments require moral concepts, then (3) Capuchin 
monkeys, it would seem, cannot possess emotions of this sort. The account of emotions 
assumed here is a cognitivist one: emotions are seen as requiring (on some implausibly 
strong versions, reducing to) judgments. One option for the defender of emotions in 
animals, therefore, is to attack the cognitivist account of emotions. We shall not pursue 
this strategy, largely because we think cognitivism about emotions is correct. Instead, we 
shall argue that even if one assumes cognitivism about emotions, and so sees emotions as 
bound up with evaluative, and sometimes moral, judgments, this is compatible with 
animals possessing emotions. The key to the argument we shall develop is the difference 
between making moral judgments and tracking moral judgments. Making moral 
judgments is not required for possession of emotions such as indignation. All that is 
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required is that the emotion, in a sense to be made clear, track moral judgments – 
judgments that the animal need not be able to make.  
Smith is indignant that Jones snubbed him. There are two ways in which this 
emotion might, let us say, misfire – roughly the analogue of what it is for a belief to be 
false. The category of a misfire is a conjunctive one. An emotion can misfire either 
because it is misplaced or misguided. Smith is indignant because he believes Jones 
snubbed him, but he is, in fact, mistaken. Jones didn’t snub him at all. Smith was being 
his usual hypersensitive self, imagining slights where there are none. Let us say that, in 
this case, Smith’s indignation is misplaced. An emotion is misplaced when it depends on 
a factual assertion’s being true when that assertion is, in fact, false. The other source of 
failure would occur if Jones has every right to snub Smith – say because of Smith’s 
boorish behavior on their most recent encounter. Smith, as we might say, deserved no 
better from Jones in this case. Let us say that Smith’s indignation is, in this case, 
misguided. An emotion such as this is misguided when it depends on a claim of 
entitlement where there is, in fact, no such entitlement. More generally, an emotion is 
misguided when (i) it requires the truth of a given evaluative claim, and (ii) this 
evaluative claim is not, in fact, true.  
The Capuchin’s indignation – which we have supposed, for the sake of argument, 
it possesses – can misfire in the same ways. It might be misplaced: for example, his 
fellow Capuchin has not been offered a grape at all, merely a cucumber. In such a case, 
the Capuchin might be angry that the researcher has nothing better to offer. But he cannot 
be indignant at the unfair way it is being treated in comparison with his fellow Capuchin. 
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Or it might be misguided: for example, the monkey has not performed the task for which 
the grape is the reward, and therefore the implicit evaluative judgment that it deserves 
better treatment is not, in fact, true. 
 The idea of an emotion being misguided allows us to understand the location in 
logical space of the evaluative component of the emotion. If an emotion, E, is not to be 
misguided, then a certain evaluative proposition, p, must be true. The truth of this 
proposition, as we might say, makes sense of the emotion. We need not think of emotions 
as reducible to evaluations. Rather, for any emotion, there is a certain evaluative 
proposition that must be true in order for the emotion to not be misguided.  
In this sense, possession of an emotion tracks a true evaluative proposition. If an 
emotion is not misguided, then there exists a certain evaluative claim, p, and p must be 
true. More precisely, there exists one and only one evaluative clam whose truth is 
guaranteed by the non-misguided status of the emotion: the indexical proposition that ‘In 
being offered a cucumber rather than a grape, I have been wronged’. The non-misguided 
status of an emotion, therefore, guarantees the truth of a given evaluative proposition. 
When we have emotions that are not misguided, these emotions track true evaluative 
propositions. To track a proposition does not require that one entertain, or even be 
capable of entertaining, it – that one be able to make the moral judgment that is tracked. 
Thus, this aponoian account of emotions avoids the charge of over-intellectualization, 
and explains how they can be spread as widely through the animal domain as both 
science and common sense take them to be. 
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The fallacy embodied in the argument that animals cannot have emotions is, 
therefore, the making/tracking confusion. An emotional state that is thought to require 
that animals make, or be capable of making, a given judgment in fact requires no such 
thing. It is sufficient for possession of the state that a given judgment or proposition be 
tracked in the sense that, if the emotion does not misfire (i.e. is not misguided or 
misplaced or both), there is a certain proposition that must be true (or two propositions – 
one factual one evaluative). 
 
7. Empathy and Moral Motivation 
The combined effects of both premature meta-articulation and the making/tracking 
confusion are nowhere more evident than in many treatments of empathy and moral 
motivation. 
The Capuchin monkey’s indignation is a self-directed emotion in that it concerns 
his or her own well-being. An important category of other-directed emotion – one that 
concerns the welfare of another – is empathy. Other-directed moral emotions are based on 
a concern – which can take either positive or negative form – about the well-being of 
another individual.  
The term 'empathy' is notoriously ambiguous. In particular, it is used, as a 
proposed explanans, in two quite different theoretical contexts. Sometimes empathy is 
understood as a mechanism involved in social cognition. For instance, in some versions 
of the simulation theory of mind, empathy is understood as an ability that enables the 
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attribution of mental states to others. By empathizing with someone, we place ourselves 
in her mental shoes and come to understand what she thinks and feels. In this theoretical 
context, the motivational or emotive connotations of the concept of empathy are usually 
bracketed.
22
 We shall not discuss this sense of empathy.  
Our concern, rather, will be with the concept of empathy as it is employed in 
moral contexts, specifically in contexts of moral motivation. Here, the concept is 
strikingly variegated: at one end of the spectrum, empathy requires breathtakingly 
complicated cognitive and conceptual abilities; at the other it is little more than a brute 
physiological reaction. Leslie Jamison, in her wonderful book, The Empathy Exams, 
veers about as far as one can in the direction of complexity: 
Empathy isn't just listening, it’s asking the questions whose answers need to be 
listened to. Empathy requires inquiry as much as imagination. Empathy requires 
knowing that you know nothing. Empathy means acknowledging a horizon of 
context that extends perpetually beyond what you can see … Empathy means 
realizing no trauma has discrete edges. Trauma bleeds. Out of wounds and across 
boundaries ... you enter another person’s pain as you’d enter another country, 
through immigration and customs, border crossing by way of query: What grows 
where you are? What are the laws? What animals graze there?
23
 
Empathy, in this sense, requires mind-reading – the ability to attribute mental states both 
to others and to oneself –, which is a form of reflexive thought, and much more besides 
                                                        
22 See, for example, Goldman (2006), p. 17: "mindreading is an extended form of empathy (where this 
term's emotive and caring connotation is bracketed)". 
23 Jamison (2014), p. 5. 
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(perspective taking, imaginative reconstruction, and so on). We shall assume, with more 
than a little confidence, that animals are incapable of empathy in Jamison’s sense. Not all 
cases of empathy need be this complex, of course. Nevertheless, one can detect a 
pronounced tendency to suppose that empathy involves mind-reading abilities: the ability 
to understand the minds of another by way of the attribution of mental states to them. 
Thus, de Vignemont and Jacob (2012) write: 
The motivational role of empathetic pain for moral and prosocial behavior ... 
has often been stressed. ... In order to react appropriately to another’s pain, 
one needs to understand the fact (or to believe) that she is in pain. Hence, 
prosocial behavior requires third-person mind reading.
24
 
A similar idea can be found in Batson (2009): 
Feeling for another person who is suffering ... is the form of empathy most 
often invoked to explain what leads one person to respond with sensitive care 
to the suffering of another. ... To feel for another, one must think one knows 
the other’s internal state ... because feeling for is based on a perception of the 
other’s welfare25 
The idea here is that, without the ability to attribute mental states to others, an 
empathically motivated helping reaction simply cannot occur. If a creature cannot 
understand the pain and suffering of the individual whose misfortune she is witnessing, 
                                                        
24 de Vignemont & Jacob (2012), p. 310. 
25 Batson (2009), pp. 9-10. 
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Consider, now, the other end of the spectrum. The most basic form of empathy, so 
basic that one might legitimately question whether it is indeed empathy, is emotional 
contagion: an involuntary affective resonance that occurs in presence of another 
individual who is undergoing a certain emotion. It requires no understanding of what 
initiated the reaction and yields a form of personal distress that is either non-intentional 
or directed at one's own well-being. There is no reason to suppose that this sort of 
reaction has a moral character, for neither the emotional reaction nor the behavior 
triggered by it are directed towards the other individual, so it is not an expression of 
other-directed concern.  
 If these two sorts of cases were exhaustive, the prospects for empathy occurring in 
animals, as a specifically moral motivational state, would be bleak. The more complex 
forms of empathy might be moral, but animals cannot possess them. The simpler forms of 
empathy animals can possess but have no moral import. In accordance with our aponoian 
paradigm, we shall argue for the existence of intermediate forms of empathy that are both 
moral and can plausibly be thought to be possessed by at least some animals. We shall 
designate the least cognitively demanding of these forms as minimal moral empathy. 
 What makes a version of empathy complex – non-minimal in our sense – is that it 
essentially involves judgment. In order to be empathically motivated, in this complex 
                                                        
26 In our view, the assumption that empathy always requires mind-reading abilities is an example of 
premature meta-articulation. We do not deny, of course, that mind-reading abilities are implicated in 
some cases of empathy. 
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sense, a creature must have the ability to make certain pertinent moral judgments. This is 
a common assumption. For example, as Dixon (2008) puts it:  
[W]hat matters to empathy understood as a moral concept is that the subject 
perceives what is morally salient about another's situation. Even this 
additional requirement doesn't quite capture what needs to be added to 
cognitive empathy to make it a morally significant concept, and that is its 
relation to sympathy or compassion. These states are genuine moral emotions 
in the case where they motivate a subject to help or to alleviate need, distress, 
or suffering when this is judged to be "serious" and undeserved. The moral 
significance of the emotional states of sympathy and compassion is explained 
by the presence of evaluative judgments as well as the motivations to act on 
these evaluations or appraisals.
27
 
Empathy, therefore, cannot be a moral emotion unless it is accompanied by explicit 
evaluative judgments by means of which one reflects upon the morally salient features of 
a situation (judgments of seriousness, deservedness, and so on). Hauser (2001) seems to 
have something similar in mind:  
At present, we have no convincing evidence that animals attribute beliefs and 
desires to others. ... Similarly, we also lack evidence that animals have access 
to their own beliefs, reflect on them, and contemplate how particular events in 
the future might change what they believe. If this lack of evidence correctly 
reveals a lack of capacity, then animals can certainly cooperate, beat each 
                                                        
27 Dixon (2008). p. 140. Emphasis is ours. 
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other to a pulp, and make up after a war. But they can't evaluate whether an 
act of reciprocation is fair, whether killing someone is wrong, and whether an 
act of kindness should be rewarded because it was the right thing to do.
28
 
A creature’s empathic reaction to the plight of another would not be a moral emotion 
unless the creature is able to view this reaction in, as Hauser puts it, “a context of right 
and wrong”. But to view it in such a context seems to require that the animal be able to 
locate its reaction in a network of judgments about right and wrong.
29
 
 If his is the case against animals possessing empathy as a moral motivation, then 
we have already outlined an apparatus that can be used to undermine this case: the 
distinction between making a judgment and tracking a judgment. To see how this works 
in the case of empathy, consider the (notoriously immoral) experiment performed by 
Masserman et al. (1964). Monkeys would refuse to pull a chain that delivered food to 
them when they found out that, by pulling said chain, a conspecific situated within their 
sight received an electric shock. One of these monkeys – let us call him M – famously 
refrained from eating for twelve days in a row. 
 Supposed M’s refusal to pull the chain was the result of a feeling of distress. This 
feeling is not simply caused by the suffering of his fellow; it is also intentionally directed 
towards that suffering. That is, M is distressed that the other is suffering. Even though 
this distress motivates M to take steps to mitigate his fellow’s suffering, this would not, 
according to Hauser and Dixon, qualify as a moral motivation. To do so, M would need 
                                                        
28 Hauser (2001), p. 312. Emphasis is his. 
29 In this passage, we can also scent, in the requirement of being able to attribute beliefs to oneself 
and others, the pungent aroma of premature meta-articulation. 
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to be able to make judgments concerning the moral status of his motivations and/or 
resulting behavior. This idea, however, is grounded in the making/tracking confusion. 
M’s empathic motivation, like emotions in general, can be misplaced or 
misguided. It is misplaced if it is based on a factual assertion that is not true: let us 
suppose its fellow monkey is not suffering. M is mistaken. It is misguided if it is based on 
a morally evaluative judgment that is false. This could arguably be the case if his fellow 
monkey, due to some extraordinarily improbable circumstances, somehow deserved to 
suffer, or if the electric shock was being delivered to him for his own good. Thus, if we 
assume that M’s emotional response is not misguided, then there exists a moral 
proposition that must be true: namely, the proposition that the monkey’s suffering is 
wrong or bad. This does not require that M be able to make this judgment. All that is 
required is that it possesses an empathic motivational state that tracks this judgment, in 
the sense that the non-misguided status of M’s motivation guarantees the truth of the 
relevant moral proposition. Even if M’s emotional reaction is a form of contagion 
triggered by watching his conspecific suffer, this does not preclude its status as a moral 
motivation. This idea of a truth-preserving or truth-guaranteeing relation between the 
emotion and a given moral judgment lies at the heart of the concept of minimal moral 
empathy. 
The key to understanding minimal moral empathy lies in the idea of a reliable 
emotional response to morally relevant features of a situation. Let us suppose, a 
supposition that seems entirely reasonable, that the suffering of M’s fellow monkey is a 
bad thing. This suffering is, therefore, a morally relevant feature of the situation: it is 
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what we might call a bad-making feature of this local situation. M’s response to this 
morally relevant, bad-making, feature is an emotional one: it takes the form of distress, 
built into which is an urge to mitigate the situation. Thus, M refuses to pull the chain. Let 
us make one further assumption: M’s response is not a random or arbitrary one. Rather, 
he responds to situations such as this in a reasonably reliable way. When monkeys are 
tortured with electric shocks, M reliably feels distress and an urge to mitigate the 
suffering. This, we might suppose, is the result of some mechanism that reliably produces 
emotional responses to at least some morally salient features of situations. In these 
circumstances, all that is required for M’s emotional response to be a moral one is this: if 
M’s emotional response is not misguided, then the moral claim, “The suffering of this 
monkey is bad” must be true. M does not need to be able to make this moral judgment, or 
entertain this moral proposition. To suppose that he does is to fall victim to the 
making/tracking confusion. It is enough that M’s emotional response tracks the moral 
proposition in the sense explained above. If it does, M’s response is an example of 
minimal moral empathy. 
We chose the example of Masserman’s monkeys for a reason. It is commonly 
thought that their behavior is open to another interpretation. As Hauser (2001) puts it: 
What is most remarkable about these experiments is the observation that some 
rhesus monkeys refrained from eating in order to avoid injuring another 
individual. Perhaps the actors empathized, feeling what it would be like to be 
shocked, what it would be like to be the other monkey in pain. Alternatively, 
perhaps seeing someone shocked is unpleasant, and rhesus will do whatever they 
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can to avoid unpleasant conditions. Although this has the superficial appearance 
of an empathic or sympathetic response, it may actually be selfish.
30
 
This claim is, if our arguments are correct, based on a false opposition. First, minimal 
moral empathy does not require the ability to imaginatively feel “what it would be like to 
be shocked.” Some cases of empathy are undoubtedly like this, but minimal moral 
empathy requires no such ability. Second, the supposition that, if M is motivated by the 
unpleasant nature of his or her emotion, this automatically disqualifies it from being 
moral is a supposition that is also unwarranted. M no doubt would find the shrieks of its 
fellow distressing. But this experiential unpleasantness may be precisely the form M’s 
concern for the other monkey takes. Compare: one would find the shrieks of distress of 
one’s children distressing, and would take immediate steps to try and stop them. Does 
this mean one is merely engaging in a selfish attempt to stop this unpleasant noise? This 
claim would be ridiculous. Of course, one finds the shrieks of distress of one’s children 
unpleasant. This is precisely the experiential form one’s concern for them takes. 
 The debate over whether the motivation of M is moral has, thus, been based on a 
false dichotomy: between a moral motivation and an aversive stimulus. The assumption 
has, typically, been that if an emotion is the result of vicarious aversive arousal, this 
precludes its qualifying as a moral emotion.
31
 If the idea of minimal moral empathy is 
correct, this assumption is unwarranted. The actual motivation of the monkey is an 
                                                        
30 Hauser (2001), p. 276. 
31 See also, for example, de Waal (2008), p. 283: “Perhaps the most compelling evidence for 
emotional contagion came from Wechkin et al. (1964) and Masserman et al. (1964), who found that 
monkeys refuse to pull a chain that delivers food to them if doing so delivers an electric shock to and 
triggers pain reactions in a companion. Whether their sacrifice reflects concern for the other ... 
remains unclear, however, as it might also be explained as avoidance of aversive vicarious arousal.” 
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empirical matter, on which we do not take a stand here. Our point is this: even if its 
emotional response is a case of vicarious aversive arousal, this is perfectly compatible 
with its being a moral emotion – a case of what we call minimal moral empathy. 
 In addition to the making/tracking confusion, the issue of moral motivation in 
animals is also clouded by an unfortunate tendency toward premature meta-articulation. 
This emerges, in particular, in connection with the common idea that animals cannot act 
morally because they lack control over their motivations and actions. Here is a way of 
thinking about motivation in general, and moral motivation in particular, a way made 
admirably clear by Christine Korsgaard. In her response to de Waal’s Tanner Lectures 
that were published as Primates and Philosophers, Korsgaard comments on the status of 
the lower animals – a spider crawling towards a moth that is caught in the middle of her 
web: 
Here we begin to be tempted to use the to use the language of action, and it is 
clear enough why: when an animal’s movements are guided by her perceptions, 
they are under the control of her mind, and when they are under the control of her 
mind, we are tempted to say they are under the animal’s own control. And this, 
after all, is what makes the difference between an action and a mere movement – 




As the animal in question becomes more complex, the degree of control it is capable of 
exerting over its movements becomes correspondingly greater: 
                                                        
32 Korsgaard (2006), p. 108. Emphasis is ours. 
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Even if there is a gradual continuum, it seems right to say that an animal that can 
entertain his purposes before his mind, and perhaps even entertain thoughts about 
how to achieve those purposes, is exerting a greater degree of conscious control 




This is the first appeal to the meta-level: an animal that can think about its purposes, 
perhaps even its thoughts, is more in control of its movements than an animal that cannot 
do this. With humans, however, Korsgaard believes there is a qualitative leap. The reason 
is that we can choose our ends, and not merely choose how to achieve ends antecedently 
given to us by our nature and the demands of our environment: “For we exert a deeper 
level of control over [our] own movements when we choose our ends as well as the 
means to them than that exhibited by an animal that pursues ends that are given to her by 
her affective states.”34 As Korsgaard notes, this ability to choose ends – to assess and 
adopt them rather than merely have them – is what Kant called “autonomy”. And it is 
only when we have autonomy, Korsgaard claims, that specifically moral agency 
emerges.
35
 The reason this is a qualitative leap, Korsgaard claims, is because it requires a 
specific form of self-consciousness that only humans, in fact, have.  
What I mean is this: a nonhuman agent may be conscious of the object of his fear 
or desire, and conscious of it as fearful or desirable, and so as something to be 
avoided or sought. That is the ground of his action. But a rational animal is, in 
addition, conscious that she fears or desires the object, and that she is inclined to 
                                                        
33 Korsgaard (2006), p. 109. Emphasis is ours. 
34 Korsgaard (2006), p. 112. 
35 Korsgaard (2006), p. 112. 
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act in a certain way as a result … Once you are aware that you are being moved in 
a certain way, you have a certain reflective distance from the motive, and you are 
in a position to ask yourself, ”but should I be moved in that way?” Wanting that 
end inclines me to do that act, but it does it really give me a reason to do that act? 




The centrality of the concept of control is very evident in Korsgaard’s argument. The 
greater the degree of control an individual has over his actions, the greater the warrant 
there is for regarding that individual as an agent. In the case of humans, we have a type of 
control over our motivations (“ends”) that no other creature has: we can choose our ends. 
This is grounded in a uniquely human form of self-consciousness that provides us with 
“reflective distance” between us and our motives, thereby allowing us to scrutinize those 
motives and ask ourselves whether they are ones we should endorse or reject. This is 
what makes moral action possible. In short, we have a form of control over our motives 
that no other creature has; and it is this control that allows us to act morally.  
It is easy to feel the intuitive pull of this idea. It is tempting to suppose that in the 
absence of the relevant meta-cognitive abilities – the ability to form higher-order 
thoughts about our motivations and purposes – we are at their “mercy”. They push us this 
way and that. Unable to critically scrutinize these motivations, we have no control over 
what they cause us to do. Meta-cognitive abilities, however, would transform us. Armed 
with these abilities, we can sit above the motivational fray: observing, judging and 
evaluating our motivations, coolly deciding the extent to which we will allow them to 
                                                        
36 Korsgaard (2006), p. 113. Emphasis is hers. 
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determine our decisions and actions. This gives us a control over our motivations that we 
would otherwise lack.  
 Nevertheless, despite its intuitive appeal, it is doubtful that this picture of control 
can work. Indeed, the problems here precisely parallel those faced by the HOT model of 
consciousness. Specifically, there is a recalcitrant property – the property of being under 
the control of the agent – that first-order states (motivations, purposes, etc.) lack. We 
introduce higher order states – thoughts about those motivations and purposes – to supply 
this control. But then the same issue of control will, logically, arise at this higher-order 
too. Meta-cognition was supposed to allow us to sit above the motivational fray, and 
calmly pass judgment on our motivations, thus providing us with control over them. 
However, there is no reason to suppose that meta-cognition is above this motivational 
fray. If first-order motivations can pull us this us this way and that, then second-order 
evaluations of those motivations can do exactly the same. 
 The appeal to meta-cognition to imbue us with control over our motivations, thus, 
faces a dilemma: essentially the same dilemma we discovered with the HOT model of 
consciousness. Do we have control over our meta-cognitive assessments of our purposes 
and motivations? If so, then we have not explained the notion of control, but simply 
assumed it. But if not, then it is difficult to see how these meta-cognitive assessments 
could supply us with control over our motivations and purposes. The appeal to the meta-
level as a way of explaining control over motivations, therefore, gets us nowhere. It is 
another example of premature meta-articulation (specifically, in its miracle-of-the-meta 
form).   
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This is a well-known problem with the idea that we can explain autonomy by the 
appeal to meta-level phenomena. It is common to respond to this problem through the 
addition of further factors concerning the conditions under which this meta-cognition 
takes place. For example, a common response is to insist that the reflection must take 
place under conditions free of distorting factors, or must reflect an adequate causal 
history, and so on. These are perfectly reasonable ways of trying to safeguard the idea of 
autonomy. But, if they work, it is only by divorcing the concept of autonomy from that of 
control. Whether or not one’s meta-cognizing takes place under conditions free of 
distorting factors, or reflects an adequate causal history, is not something that is under the 
agent’s control – indeed these are things that may remain unknown, perhaps even 
unknowable, to the agent. 
The appeal to the meta-level in order to explain control is not only fruitless, it is 
also, in the eyes of many, unnecessary. We can explain autonomy without venturing 
outside the first-order. On the contrary, all that is required is, postulation of a choice 
mechanism that translates beliefs about our alternatives, coupled with our desires, into 
plans of action that are designed to realize those desires. This alternative strategy is a, 
broadly, compatibilist one. For the compatibilist, being produced in this way by the 
appropriate choice mechanism – a mechanism that is ‘responsive to reasons’ – is 
precisely what it is to be an autonomous subject. There is, as yet, no reason to suppose 
that animals cannot possess such mechanisms. 
Discussions of empathy and moral motivation, thus, habitually fall victim to both 
premature meta-articulation and the making/tracking confusion. To understand the extent 
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to which animals are capable of empathic and even moral behavior, these confusions 
must be expunged from the debate. 
 
8. Conclusion 
There is a pronounced tendency in empirical studies and theoretical treatments of animals 
to underestimate their abilities not because some distinctive lack or aporia has been 
discovered in them, but because of implausibly intellectualist accounts of the abilities 
they are supposed to lack. If animals are thought to lack consciousness, for example, this 
will stem not from anything we have discovered about animals themselves, but from an 
implausibly (over) intellectualist account of what consciousness is. The same is true of 
their purported lack of beliefs, emotions, empathy and the ability to act morally. In all 
these cases, the alleged deficiency of animals derives not from our discovery of some 
deficiency in them but, rather, from an unreasonably over-intellectualized conception of 
these phenomena. At the heart of this intellectualization, we have identified two errors: 
the tendency toward premature meta-articulation and the making/tracking confusion. As 
an antidote towards this sort over-intellectualization, and resulting underestimation of 
animals, we recommend adoption of the aponoian paradigm. Intellect is rarely as 
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